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ABSTRACT
This study examines the relationship between corporate governance
structures and the performance of matched-pairs of Government Linked
Companies (GLCs) and Non-Government Linked Companies (NGLCs).
The empirical results indicate that there are eight statistically significant
differences between the corporate governance structures of GLCs
and NGLCs, thus providing a rationale for examining the association
between corporate governance structure and firm performance of these
two distinct groups. Accordingly, univariate and multivariate analyses
were performed on two sample sets: GLCs and NGLCs. In the univariate
analysis, only Board size (BSZ) exhibited a significant relationship with
respect to firm performance, in contrast the multivariate analysis found
no empirical evidence of a consistent relationship between corporate
governance structure and performance, which was measured in relation
to Return On Assets (ROA) and Return On Equity (ROE) in GLCs and
NGLCs over the same period. Statistically significant relationships were
found across groupings andfor different performance measures, but were
not sustained across all the years considered. The results indicate that
despite the identification ofeight differences in the governance structures
ofGLCs and NGLCs, the observed differences in firm performance cannot
be explained by governance structure. This finding supports the view
that governance structures purely provide appropriate means to monitor
company management rather than improve performance.
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INTRODUCTION
Although Government Linked Companies (GLCs) have undoubtedly
been a major element in the socio-economic development of Malaysia,
their performance has lagged behind that of more established Non-
Government Linked Companies (NGLCs) (Lemmon and Lins, 2003).
Previous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that the corporate
governance structures of GLCs have a detrimental effect on firm
performance . Among the empirical studies, Boardman and Vining (1989)
analyzed the relative performance of the 500 largest non-U.S. mining and
manufacturing companies in 1983 to determine whether privately owned
firms outperform State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), Mixed ownership
Enterprises (MEs) and privately owned firms. Their findings indicated
that private corporations are more profitable and efficient (measured as
sales per employee and per asset) than SOEs and MEs. A longitudinal
study by Dewenteur and Malatesta (1997), spanning a twenty-year period,
determined that government firms display inferior profitability with respect
to GLCs and NGLCs; a more recent study by Wang (2003) also found that
GLCs performed worse than NGLCs.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Corporate Governance Practices of GLCs and NGLCs in the
Context of Economic, Political and Social Backgrounds in
Malaysia
The historical background of the economic, political and social
circumstances in Malaysia have had a profound impact on corporate
governance practices, because the country comprises of various races,
religions, creeds, customs and languages (Haniffa, 1999), although
Malaysians may be segregated into two main groups; bumiputra and non-
bumiputra. After independence in 1957, the economic state of the country
was relatively poor and even with an annual real growth in Gross Domestic
Product (GOP) of 6.3% over the period 1961-1970 ethnic inequality
had increased as economic activity was dominated by non-bumiputra
(Ministry of Finance, 1970). The ratio of non-bumiputra to bumiputra
median incomes rose from 1.99:1 in 1957/58 to 2.20:1 in 1967/68 (Gomez
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and Jomo, 1997) and with a worsening economic outlook, coupled with
frustration over the economic dominance of non-bumiputra, culminated in
ethnic violence in 1969 (Jayasankaran and Hiebert, 1997).
In order to alleviate the situation, the government embarked on
affirmative action in the form of the New Economic Policy (NEP) in
1970. The launching of the NEP was an economic turning point in that
the government played a significant role and was actively involved in
establishing a broad range of productive enterprises (Abdullah , 1992).
The NEP had two major objectives : to eradicate poverty regardless of race
and to restructure society by eliminating the identification of race with
economic function. The ultimate objective of the NEP was to redistribute
wealth more equally amongst Malaysian society (Hensley et al., 1993).
FORMATION OF GLCS
In the early 1980s, the government made a significant incursion into the
corporate sector by establishing GLCs, which was designed to act as
a catalyst to achieve the objectives of the NEP. In a Treasury Circular
(Ministry of Finance, 1993) a GLC was defined as a company in which
the Government controls more than 20% of the equity shares through
Khazanah Nasional Berhad (KNB), the Ministry of Finance (MOF), and
other federal and state government-linked agencies .The formation ofGLCs
was performed progressively through privatisation and corporatisation;
whereby many government departments were first privatised and later
transformed into separate wholly-owned government companies (Ministry
of Finance, 1993).
It was hoped that the privatisation policy would expedite attainment
of the NEP's goal of providing more avenues for bumiputra businessmen
to participate in economic activities . Further to this the policy would
reduce the government's burden by providing essential services to the
public, for example road construction, health services, energy and power.
Under government patronage, these privatised companies thrived and
became very successful; subsequently, many of them were corporatized
through the issuing of a portion of their shares through Bursa Malaysia.
As the government maintained substantial ownership in these companies,
these corporatized entities became to be known as Government-Linked
Companies or GLCs (Ministry of Finance, 1993). Some of the more
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prominent GLCs are Golden Hope Plantations Berhad, Kumpulan
Guthrie Berhad, Telekom Malaysia Berhad (TMB), Malaysian Airline
System (MAS) and Tenaga Nasional Berhad (TNB). Other than through
corporatisation exercises, the government also obtained substantial
ownership in many PLCs, directly or indirectly, through its investment
holding companies.
The government also controls other major institutional funds, such as
Perbadanan Nasional Berhad (PNB), the Employee Provident Fund (EPF),
the Military Fund Board (LTAT), the Pilgrimage Fund Board (TH) and the
Pension Trust Fund (KWAP). A panel of supervisory boards manages all
these trust funds, but all decisions pertaining to investment strategies are
under the authority and jurisdiction of the government. Collectively these
institutional funds are known as government investment companies or
GUCs (Ministry of Finance, 1993). Furthermore, all the State Economic
and Development Corporations (SEDCs) and other state agencies that
have at least a 20% shareholding in PLCs are also considered as GLCs
(Ministry of Finance, 1993). As a consequence of the formation of GLCs
via the NEP, the business environment and corporate governance structure
of GLCs in Malaysia became quite unique (Thillainathan, 1999a).
OBJECTIVES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This study investigates whether there is a relationship between the
corporate governance structure and firm performance of GLCs and
NGLCs in the post-Asian Financial Crisis (AFC) period from 2001 to
2003. Due to the manner in which GLC's were established it is anticipated
that GLCs and NGLCs will exhibit very different corporate governance
structures. Consequently, the first part of the presented study focuses upon
the identification of any significant differences between the corporate
governance structures of GLCs and NGLCs. The second part explores
whether the identified differences in corporate governance structures have
any significant effect on firm performance.
The first research question is: Are there any significant differences
in the corporate governance structure of GLCs and NGLCs in the post-
AFC period from 2001 to 2003? The second research question is: Do
differences in the corporate governance structure of GLCs and NGLCs
directly influence firm performance, over the period 2001 to 2003?
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RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
A comprehensive literature review pertaining to corporate governance
of GLCs and NGLCs, and firm performance enabled testable hypotheses
to be developed and identification of data required to perform the tests.
Research objectives were established through analysis of interview
responses from senior officers at the MOF with respect to the corporate
characteristics of GLCs.
Using the matched-pair method applied by Daily and Dalton (1997)
GLCs on the Bursa Malaysia were paired with NGLCs. Univariate analysis
and paired sample-t-tests were conducted on the GLCs and NGLCs for
2001, 2002 and 2003 in order to ascertain any significant differences
in the governance variables. Bivariate tests conducted on the GLCs
and NGLCs were used to establish whether there are any statistically
significant relationships between each independent variable and firm
performance measured, ROA or ROE, existed. Multivariate analysis was
used to determine whether a statistically significant relationship existed
between the corporate governance structures of GLCs and NGLCs, and
firm performance; if interrelationship between explanatory variables is
permitted.
SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
The target population in this study comprised of companies listed on Bursa
Malaysia in 2001, 2002 and 2003, and were in one of the seven economic
sectors; construction, consumer products , industrial products, plantations ,
property, trading/services and technology. The sample companies chosen
in this study included an equal number of GLCs and NGLCs taken from
the target population and were selected according to the process presented
in Table 1.
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Table 1: Stages Applied in Matched-Pair Identification
Description 2001I--------........-'-.."....~
Listed GLCs identified on Bursa Malaysia including 111
banks and Financial Institutions, PN4 Companies
and companies still under restructuring .
After deduction of Financial Institutions, PN4
Companies andcompan ies under restructuring
Letters sent to paired GLCs (89) and NGLCs (89)
Annual Reports received [Hard and soft-copies)
After deduction of companies with extremeJyhigh
profitability or losses (outliers)
After deduction ofoutliers
One hundred and eleven GLCs were identified from the target
population, which reduced to eighty-nine after the deduction of Banks,
Financial Institutions, PN4 companies and companies undergoing
government restructuring (post-AFC). Letters of enquiry were sent out to
all the identified GLCs and matching NGLCs of which fifty-three pairs
(one hundred and six companies) responded (including e-mail responses).
All the pairs were examined for evidence ofoutliers, which constitutes
as a company with abnormally high profitability or losses, or negative net
assets. Outliers need to be excluded because they can cause model bias
by affecting estimated regression coefficient values (Field, 2001). Four
companies in all of the years considered were found to exhibit extremely
high profits or losses and were thus classified as outliers and excluded
from further analysis, as were three companies with negative assets, Table
1. Thus seven further pairs (fourteen companies) were excluded, since if
a company from a pair is excluded; the matched company must also be
removed.
As such, forty-six pairs (ninety-two companies) were included in the
final test samples for 200 I and 2002, however for 2003 this was reduced to
forty-four pairs (eighty-eight companies), because two of the GLCs were
delisted from the Stock Exchange in 2003. Although these two companies
were replaced with the listing of their subsidiaries, it is considered to be a
new listing and therefore the two GLCs together with their pairings were
excluded for analysis.
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OPERATIONALISATION OF THE DEPENDENT, INDEPENDENT
AND CONTROL VARIABLES
Finn performance is evaluated with respect to the dependent variables
ROA and ROE, where ROA is the average annual realised rate of return
defined to be earnings after tax divided by the total assets and ROE is
the average annual realised rate of return defined to be earnings after tax
divided by shareholder equity. These performance criteria are consistent
with those used in other studies, and are frequently used by market and
financial analysts in assessing company performance (Shrader et al., 1997),
whereby high ROA and ROE values signify favourable finn performance.
Fourteen independent variables are considered in the presented
study, all of which are features of the internal governance system related
to the board structure and composition. The fourteen variables identified
are Board Size (BSZ), Board Meeting Frequency (BMF) , Role Duality
(RDU), Non-Executive Directors (NEX), Independent Directors (lND) ,
Directors with Accounting and Finance Qualifications (OAF), Women
Directors (WOM), Bumiputra Directors (BUM), Senior Government
Officers Directors (SGO), Politician Directors (POL), Family Member
Directors (FAM), Audit Committee Size (ACS), Audit Committee
Meeting Frequency (ACM) and Big-Four Auditors (AUD), were selected
based on the preliminary findings of a pilot study and an in-depth study of
literature pertaining to corporate governance structures in the Malaysian
business environment.
Two control variables; sales and industry-type were also included
in order to minimize finn performance being influenced by other factors.
The natural Logarithm of Annual Sales (LSALE) is used as the proxy for
size and is expected to be positively related to performance, since larger
firms tend to be more profitable than smaller firms and benefit from the
economies of scale and can spread their risk (Ghosh, 1998). Variations in
performance, based on industry type, were addressed through the creation
of dummy variables for each of the seven-industry classifications used
by Bursa Malaysia (construction, consumer products, industrial products,
plantations, property , trading/services and technology).
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HYPOTHESES TESTING
This study considers the following three hypotheses for the two
aforementioned research objectives.
H1 GLC Corporate governance structures differ significantly from those of
NGLCs.
H2 There is a significant relationship between corporate governance structures
and the performance of GLCs in the post·AFC period from 2001 to 2003.
H3 There is a significant relationship between corporate governance structures
and the performance of NGLCs in the post·AFC period from 2001 to 2003.
The hypotheses were assessed in relation to firm performance and
the fourteen identified independent variables pertaining to corporate
governance structures. Of the fourteen considered only three; BUM, POL
and SGO, are not commonly used in assessing firm performance, but
have been included since they are of significance with respect to the NEP
(1971) and leA implementation (1975) in Malaysia. These directors are
implicitly believed to have considerable links with the government and
their appointments are consistent with resource dependence theory.
SUMMARY OF THE UNIVARIATE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE (ROA
AND ROE)
This section presents the results for the univariate analysis of the
relationships between the independent variables and firm performance
with respect to ROA and ROE, which are presented in Tables 2 and 3,
respectively.
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Table 2: Return on Asse ts (ROA)
GLCs NGLCs
VAR 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
1. B5Z +0.385 *** +0.347 ** +0.289 * +0.130
2. BMF +0.159 --0.026 + .334** +0.196
3. RDU --0.223 --0.204 --0.006 --0.089
.,
4.NEX +0.047 --0.151 --0.202 +0.090
5.IND --0.079 --0.095 +0.132 --0.235
6.DAF +0.074 +0.235 +0.235 +0.000
7.wOM --0.060 --0.105 - 0.291** -- 0.351 **
8. BUM +0.140 --0.131 +0.007 -o.oss
9.5GO --0.030 --0.076 +0.149 + 0.322 **
10. POL +0.060 --0.131 +0.208 + 0.326 '*
11.FAM --0.099 --0.120 --0.095 --0.171
12. AC5 + 0.312 ** + 0.308 ** +0.060 --0.127
13.ACM +0.086 --0.059 +0.113 --0.069
14.AUD --0.058 -- 0.381 ** --0.195 -0.149 --0.245
(Spearman coefficients-Significant at 1%= **', 5%= ** and 10%= *)
Table 3: Return on EqUity (ROE)
GLCs NGLCs
,
VAR 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
1. B5Z +0.532 *.* + 0.328** +0.405 " * + 0.358** +0.044 --0.081
2. BMF + 0.354 *. --0.055 + 0.324 ** + 0.386*** + 0.262* +0.087
3. RDU --0.099 --0.224 +0.075 +0.155 +0.009 +0.000
4.NEX +0.100 --0.180 i --0.200 --0.026 +0.040 +0.035
5. IND --0.026 - 0.005 i +0.096 --0.195 - 0.251 --0.040
6. DAF --0.076 +0.132 +0.138 --0.155 +0.038 --0.034
7.WOM - 0.024 --0.233 --0.158 --0.145 -- 0.314** - 0.303 **
8. BUM +0.069 --0.019 --0.133 --0.D15 +0.086 --0.065
9. 5GO -0.117 - 0.087 +0.007 - 0.018 I +0.213 +0.288*
10. POL +0.153 I +0.054 +0.055 +0.129 + 0.394*** +0.285* ~
11.FAM --0.033 --0.011 -0.107 +0.024 I --0.021 r --0.129
12. AC5 +0.151 +0.015 +0.097 + 0.062* +0.076 +0.110
13.ACM +0.082 --0.077 +0.064 +0.085 +0.150 --0.020
14.AUD --0.082 --0.190 - 0.324** - 0.013 -0.089 --0.127
(Spearman coefficients-Significa nt at 1%= ***, 5%= ** and 10%= *)
9
SOCIAL AND MANAGEMENT RESEARCH JOURNAL
From the results presented it is evident that some of the independent
variables exhibit significant correlations thereby supporting the proposed
hypotheses.
SUPPORTED HYPOTHESES
Board size (BSZ) is the only independent variable that consistently
exhibits significant correlation to firm performance. For both ROA and
ROE assessment there is significant correlation between BSZ and GLC
firm performance for all three years considered, which supports H2. A
significant BSZ correlation is only exhibited for NGLCs with respect to
ROE in 2001, therefore H3 is only partially supported.
PARTIALLY SUPPORTED HYPOTHESES
H2 is only partially supported with respect to BMF, which exhibits
significant correlations for two years and one year for ROE and ROA,
respectively. It is of note that there is partial support for H3 in relation
to BMF, but only with respect to ROE; 2001 and 2002. Significant
correlations with respect to composition are inconsistent; H3 is partially
supported with respect to WOM for both ROA and ROE; 2002 and 2003,
POL for ROA and ROE in one and two years, respectively, and SGO only
exhibits significant correlations for NGLCs for ROA and ROE in 2003.
The hypotheses with respect to audit committees and auditors are also
inconsistently supported; ACS exhibits significant correlation with respect
to NGLCs in 2001 for both ROA and ROE, but for GLCs significant
correlation is only exhibited for ROA in 2001, and AUO only exhibits
significant correlation in 2003 for GLCs with respect to both ROA and
ROE.
REJECTED HYPOTHESES
The results presented indicate that six variables; ROU, NEX, OAF, BUM,
FAM and ACM, exhibit no significant correlations for any years and for
neither type of company, and consequently the hypotheses relating to
these variables are rejected.
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RESULTS OF THE PAIRED SAMPLE T·TESTS ON GLCS AND
NGLCS
Based on the results of the paired sample-t-tests conducted on GLCs and
NGLCs for 2001,2002 and 2003, significant differences exist between the
governance structures with respect to eight independent variables , Table
4. Comparison of GLCs and NGLCs using paired-sample t-tests indicate
statistically significant difference s in seven of the fourteen identified
governance variables. Four of these; NEX, BUM, SGO and FAM, are
statistically significant with a 1% confidence level for all years, whereas
BSZ, BMF and RDU are significant with at least 10% confidence level
(except BSZ in 2001 and 2002, and RDU in 2003 with I% confidence
levels) . Analyses of the identified differences suggest that GLCs have more
frequent board meetings (BMF) than NGLCs, which may be a consequence
of having larger boards, there is also a higher representation of NEX,
BUM and SGO in GLCs compared to NGLCs. However NGLCs exhibit
greater family member representation , FAM, and more role duality, RDU,
than GLCs. POL was also determined to be statistically significant for two
years (2001 and 2002) and constituted the eighth significant independent
variable. Hence, HI is supported in that the first corporate governance
structures of GLCs differ significantly from those of NGLCs.
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Table 4: Comparison of the Mean, t-Value and Significant Differences between GLCs
and NGLCs for 2001, 2002 And 2003
2001 Paired 2002 2003
.ample
lest
51g. Mean Mean 51g.
(2·talled) (2·tailed)
0.001' " 8.9412 3.776 8.5100 1.007 0.063'
NG 7.2000 7.6000 7.8000
0.032" 6.2000 2.174 0.035"
5.2889
RDU G 0.1373 ·2.11 0.040" 0.1373 ·2.023 0.048" 0.0900
NG 0.3300 0.3100
0.000' " 82.181 6.107 0.000'"
63.816
IND G 37.122 0.716 39.167 -0.658 40.5796 -0.187
NG 40.663
-0.03 23.063 -0.132
23355
WOM G 9.1980 2.051 8.5157 2.844 0.006'" 62558 0.Q76
NG 5.3725 3.5765 6.0918
6.973 0.000'" 72.508 6.349 0.000'" 755307 7466 0.000'"
44.463 40.6536
5GO G 58.396 52.749 9.053 0.000'" 51.132 6198 0.000'"
21.677 21.16
10 6.9588 2.274 0.027"
2.3333 2.7
11 FAM G 3.0549 ·3.85 0.000'" 3.5882 ·3.152 0.003'" 3.4498 o.oor
NG 16.077 13.369 164291
12 3.8235 0.659 1.238
NG 3.4706 3.7255 3.6
13 ACM G 4.3333 -0.230 5.1800 0.798 5.1400 -0.191
NG 4.3700 4.9800 5.2045
14 -1.4 ·1.4 1.1111 0
NG 1.2353 1.2353 1.11 11
(Key: ***=statistically significant at 1%, **=statistically significant at 5%, *=statistically significant
at 10%)
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MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
Specification of Regression Models
Since eight independent variables were identified to exhibit significant
correlation to firm performance it was decided to limit the multivariate
analysis to the same eight variables, plus sales and company-type, with
respect to firm performance (ROA and ROE). The regression model used
is presented in Figure I, where i = I, 2,..., n and corresponds to each firm.
Figure 1: The Regression Model
where Yi corresponds to the dependent variables: Return on Assets
(ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) , and the independent variables are:
XJ board size
Xl frequency ofboard meetings
X, role duality
X. percentage of nan- executive directors
Xs percentoge of bumiputro directors
X. percentage of government officers as directors
X7 percentage offamily members as directors
X. percentage of politicians as directors
Xg sales (in millions)
«; industry-type
Bo constant
E
.
error term
Multiple linear regression analysis was performed on GLC and
NGLC datasets for 2001,2002 and 2003 using SPSS. According to Cooke
(1998) better relationships between corporate governance variables and
performance can be established if data is transformed, hence the datasets
were normalised with respect to the number of observations so that each
region are equal; this method is more commonly referred to as the Van Der
Waerden (1953) approach. The main advantage of transforming data to
normal scores is that any subsequent analyses, which require normalised
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data, will exhibit significance levels that can be determined with more
confidence; F- and t-tests may be more meaningful, and the power of the F-
and t-tests may be fully utilized (Cooke, 1998). Additionally, the regression
coefficients derived using normal scores preserve the monotonocity in the
relationships between the independent and dependent variables , and in
the case of non-linear systems exhibiting data concentration, the use of
normal scores can be used to disperse the data.
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS ON THE NORMALISED DATASETS
WITH RESPECT TO GROUPING AND YEAR
Table 5 presents a summary of the analysis performed on the normalised
datasets with respect to grouping and year accompanied by the significance
of independent variables.
Table 5: Multivariate analysis results for the normalised GLC and NGLC datasets with
respect to grouping and year
No Variab les Firm GLCs NGLCs
Performance
2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003
1 BSZ ROA + + + + + --
ROE + *** + + ** + ** + -
2 BMf ROA +
--
+ + + -
ROE +
-
+ + ** + -
3 RDU ROA - - - + - -
ROE - - - + - +
4 NEX ROA + - --* -- + +**
ROE + - - -- + +***
5 BUM ROA +
- -- - -
**
ROE + + - - - - *
6 SGO ROA - * - - + - +*
ROE - - - + - +
7 FAM ROA
--
+
-- - -
+
ROE - + - + + +
8 POL ROA
-
..
- + + + *
ROE -- - - -- +** +
9 LSALE ROA +*** +** + + +*** +*
ROE + +*•• + + +....* +*
10 INDUS ROA +*** +*** +
- - -
ROE - +** + + - +
(Key: ***=statistically significant at 1%. **=statistica lly significant at 5%, *=statistica lly significant
at 10%)
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BSZ TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
For GLCs, there is a consistent and positive relationship between BSZ
and firm performance (ROA and ROE) for all the years considered;
furthermore they are statistically significant for ROE in 2001 and 2003
at 1% and 5% confidence levels, respectively. Therefore, the hypothesis
that a significant relationship between BSZ and the firm performance of
GLCs exists is supported for two out of three years. NGLCs relationship
with firm performance (ROA and ROE) is positive for 2001 and 2002,
with statistical significance of 5% in 2001, but negative in 2003. The
implications are that the hypothesis, which proposes that a significant
relationship between BSZ and the firm performance of NGLCs exists,
only has support for one year in three with respect to ROE.
Overall, the results indicate that a positive relationship between
BSZ and firm performance exists, but the relationship is not statistically
significant for any of the years with respect to ROA, whereas for ROE
the relationship is statistically significant for one year and two years out
of three for NGLCs and GLCs, respectively. This result is consistent
with the work of Chaganti et al. (1985), Pearce and Zahra (1992), Dalton
et al. (1998), and Kiel and Nicholson (2003) who determined that BSZ is
positively associated with firm performance. It can be concluded that the
hypothesis of a significant relationship between BSZ and performance has
limited support for ROE, but is not supported with respect to ROA. The
variable results between year and grouping are consistent with the lack of
agreement on the extent and direction of any relationship between BSZ
and firm performance present in extant literature.
BMF TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
There is a consistent and positive relationship between BMF and firm
performance (ROA and ROE), except for GLCs in 2002 and NGLCs in
2003. However, there is no statistically significant relationship for GLCs
and therefore the hypothesis of a significant relationship between BMF
and performance is not supported. For NGLCs a statistically significant
relationship only exists for ROE in 2001, which means that the hypothesis
that a significant relationship between BMF and firm performance exists
has limited support .
15
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From the results presented it is apparent that there is a positive
relationship between BMF and firm performance, however there is little
statistical significance and therefore the support for H2 and H3 is limited
with respect to BMF. The inconsistency in the results are in agreement
with extant literature, which states that the relationship between BMF and
firm performance is complex and its direction is uncertain (Evans et al.,
2002).
NEX TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
The results indicate that there is little or no evidence to support that a
relationship exists between NEX and firm performance with respect to
ROA and ROE. Therefore even though NEX may be a majority on firm
boards, they do not significantly influence firm performance. This could
be attributed to a lack of business acumen and that acquaintances perform
their duties on their behalf, because they are not fully involved in company
management (Patton and Baker, 1987). Hence Non-Executive Directors
may not be effective and capable in discharging their duties, thus failing
to enhance firm performance, but their presence on the board of directors
is to merely provide checks and balance rather than contribute through
business expertise. The results presented are consistent with the work
of Goodstein et al. (1994) who suggested that large numbers of NEX
could stifle strategic actions and constitute unnecessary monitoring of
management with a consequent reduction in firm performance. This is
also in agreement with the works of Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), and
Mehran (1995) who determined that there were no significant relationships
between NEX and firm performance.
It is of note that there is a significant positive correlation between
NEX and performance in 2003 for NGLCs, which is consistent with the
findings of Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Lee et al. (1992), Pearce and
Zahra (1992), and Ezzamel and Watson (1993) who reported a positive
relationship between the proportion of NEX on the board and firm
performance .
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BUM TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
The results provide little support for H2 and H3 with respect to a significant
relationship between BUM and firm performance. The majority of the
directions are negative, which implies that this variable has a depressing
impact on performance and could be due to bumiputra directors focusing
on the short-term (Hofstede, 1991) or exhibiting high uncertainty
avoidance, which is reflected in their values of non-assertiveness, conflict
avoidance and uneasiness in dealing with ambiguities and uncertainties
(Abdullah, 1992). As such, the presence of Bumiputera on boards might
just be window dressing in order to maintain good relations with the
government (Gomez and Jomo, 1997) and is consistent with previous
Malaysian studies on the subject of BUM (Haniffa, 1999).
SGO TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
The results indicate that SGO has a very limited impact on firm performance
with only ROA exhibiting a statistically significant relationship in certain
groupings, but the relationship is inconsistent across all years. Other
groupings exhibit no relationships between SGO and firm performance.
However, the negative and positive relationships for GLCs and NGLCs,
respectively, indicate that SGOs in GLCs lower firm performance, but
increase performance in NGLCs. It is plausible that in GLCs, since SGOs
represent the shareholders (the government) their decision making might
be dictated by and be in accordance with government policies for which
profits may not be a priority and hence firm performance would be reduced.
However, in NGLCs SGOs role as board members might give a company
access to vital networks and sources of information within government,
which might consequently enhance firm performance.
FAM TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
Although not statistically significant, the relationship between FAM
and firm performance is more pronounced in NGLCs (four out of six
instances compared to two out of six instances), which is consistent with a
number of recent empirical studies in South Korea (Joh, 2003) and Hong
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Kong (Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002) which indicate that controlling
family ownership relates directly to better firm performance. A study by
Barontini and Caprio (2005) stated that family control is positively related
to firm value and operating performance. Overall the results indicate
that companies that are controlled by a family do not outperform other
companies and therefore the hypothesis that FAM is a strong determinant
with respect to firm performance in Malaysian firms is not supported.
POL TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
Differences exist between the results for GLCs and NGLCs; there is a
consistent negative relationship for GLCs, but a positive relationship for
NGLCs in five out of the six samples. These differences are consistent
with resource dependence theory, since politicians are valuable to
NGLCs, because they can provide access to resources and networks
within government (Gomez and Jomo, 1997). However, since there are no
consistent statistically significant results, the hypothesis that a significant
relationship exists between POL and firm performance is not supported.
LSALE TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
There is a consistent positive relationship between company size (proxied
by LSALE) and firm performance for all groups of companies in all years.
GLCs exhibit three statistically significant relationships; ROA 2001(1%)
and 2002(5%), and ROE 2002(1%), which indicates that in GLCs
company size is statistically significant to firm performance in three out
of six samples. NGLCs also exhibit relationships for four samples; ROA
and ROE in 2002 and 2003, with statistical significance of 1% and 10%,
respectively. This indicates that in NGLCs company size is statistically
significant to performance in four out of six samples.
The results clearly indicate that statistically significant positive
relationships exist between LSALE and firm performance (twelve out of
eighteen samples). Specifically, the results show that seven out of nine
tests and five out of nine tests are statistically significant for ROA and
ROE, respectively. Therefore , it can be concluded that company size is a
strong determinant for Malaysian firm performance.
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INDUS TO FIRM PERFORMANCE
There is a consistent positive relationship between INDUS and ROA for
GLCs; of the samples considered two exhibit statistical significance of
1%, namely those in 2001 and 2002. The relationships between INDUS
and ROE for GLCs are both negative (2001) and positive (2002 and 2003)
for which only the 2002 relationship exhibits statistical significance of
5%. There is, however, a consistent negative relationship between INDUS
and ROA for NGLCs in all years and a mixture of positive (200 I and
2003) and negative (2002) relationships between INDUS and ROE, of
which none exhibit any statistical significance.
The results indicate that INDUS is positively and significantly related
to the firm performance of GLCs, but is detrimental to that of NGLCs.
MAJOR FINDINGS OF THE STUDY
Eight differences between the corporate governance structures of GLCs
and NGLCs have been identified with respect to univariate analysis.
Consequently the first hypothesis, which proposes that there are significant
differences between the corporate governance structures of GLCs and
NGLCs, is supported. The six other variables do not have any bearing
on the first hypothesis. The results of multivariate analysis indicate that
there is no empirical evidence for differences in the relationships between
corporate governance structures and the firm performance of GLCs and
NGLCs. Although in certain years and performance aspects significant
relationships do exist; both groups exhibit inconsistency with respect to the
statistical significance of any relationships by grouping, firm performance
(ROA and ROE), and year. Such inconsistencies indicate instability in
the statistical relationships throughout the three-year period of study. The
implications of inconsistent results with respect to a three-year corporate
governance study is that empirical research may only attain conclusions
based on statistical significance at one point in time and that such
significance may only be relevant in that specific historical context and
may not persist. The results indicate that, notwithstanding the identified
eight differences in governance structure, the observed differences in firm
performance between GLCs and NGLCs cannot be explained solely in
relation to the corporate governance structure and it is of significant to note
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that the relationship between corporate governance structure and the firm
performance of GLCs and NGLCs does not differ much in the post-AFC
period from 2001 to 2003. Hence, the hypothesis proposing that there is
a significant relationship between corporate governance structure and the
firm performance of GLCs and NGLCs in the post-AFC period from 2001
to 2003 is not supported.
These findings are consistent with the ambivalent position on
the relationship between firm performance and corporate governance
variables observed in the literature, which contains many conflicting
arguments concerning the direction of relationships and empirical results
that are extremely variable. The lack of any apparent relationships between
corporate governance structure and the firm performance of GLCs and
NGLCs indicates that the governance mechanisms act in accordance with
the purpose of their establishment, which is to not specifically enhance
performance, but to enable monitoring of the management and regulating
companies thus increasing transparency and accountability, and thereby
gaining investor confidence .
The findings of this study are consistent with the work of Suto
(2003), which suggested that the absence of a clear link between corporate
governance structure and the firm performance of GLCs was a consequence
of weakened governance structures due to government interference and
policies. The problem statement stated that GLCs in Malaysia are less
efficient than NGLCs, because GLC directors are generally appointed
from the ranks of SGO, BUM and POL, who often lack business acumen
and their investment decisions may be motivated by social rather than
commercial benefits. It is therefore assumed that their appointments
contribute to the lower performance of GLCs, however this study indicates
that there is no statistical significance with respect to firm performance.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
This study has a number of limitations; the first relates to the mechanism
employed to match and pair the GLCs and NGLCs. There are over
nine-hundred companies in Bursa Malaysia, however the identification
of reasonably matched companies greatly restricts the coverage of the
samples and means that it is far from truly random. Although every effort
was made to produce an accurate match-pair, the process is inherently
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compromised, for example no exact pair existed with respect to paid-
up capital, and although the effect on firm performance is probably
minimal, an inaccurate match-pair could invalidate the sample selection
mechanism. A second limitation relates to the omission of variables in the
regression model, which could exhibit statistical significance with respect
to firm performance. The study examined the relationship of corporate
governance structure to firm performance over a three year period, which is
comparatively short and a longer period might yield more comprehensive
results. However, in spite of these limitations, this study makes some
unique contributions to the growing body of literature on the relationship
between corporate governance structure and the firm performance of
GLCs and NGLCs.
SUMMARY
This study has examined the relationship between corporate governance
structure and firm performance of GLCs and NGLCs in Malaysia in the post-
AFC period from 2001 to 2003. The findings indicate that out of fourteen
independent variables evaluated in the univariate analysis, eight exhibited
statistically significant differences between the corporate governance
structures of GLCs and NGLCs in a sample of matched pairs. The first
hypothesis, which proposed the existence of significant differences between
the corporate governance structures of GLCs and NGLCs, is supported.
Multivariate analysis of the sample, with one exception, did not elucidate
any consistent statistical significance with respect to the relationships
between a range of variables pertaining to corporate governance structure
and the firm performance, measured in terms of ROE and ROA, of GLCs
and NGLCs. The exception was BSZ, but statistical significance was only
exhibited with respect to ROE, not ROA. The second and third hypotheses,
which stated that significant relationships between corporate governance
structure and the firm performance of GLCs and NGLCs in the post-AFC
period from 2001 to 2003 exist , is not supported. These results suggest
that observed differences in the firm performance of GLCs and NGLCs
cannot be explained with respect to the corporate governance structure
in place and that governance structures in GLCs and NGLCs probably
enable appropriate monitoring of company management, as opposed to
improving performance.
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Although no consistent relationships between corporate governance
variables and firm performance over the three year period of study
were identified; a number of variables exhibit relationships of statistical
significance in at least one period for ROA or ROE, but not both. This
variability and the more general findings are consistent with the plethora
of contradictory literature pertaining to the possibility of a relationship
between corporate governance structure and firm performance. This study
also identified that the relatively poor performance of GLCs in Malaysia,
which has in the past been attributed to government influence on the board
structure, such as the appointment of BUM, SGO and POL, is unfounded,
because these variables exhibit no statistical significance with respect to
adverse firm performance. As such, the under-performance of GLCs in
Malaysia is a consequence of other, as yet unidentified, factors.
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